When people say "the Jews did it", they only meant "Paul Wolfowitz and his Neoconning cronies did it"

They talk about a Jewish conspiracy that is how they think, because they are antisemitic retards who can only express themselves in terms of hatred of Jews, when, if they had heard of the Wolfowitz Doctrine, they could have - after reading it - just express their ethical objections to it instead of going on about the Jews again. But this is how antisemites think and feel: blame the Jew, relive their ancestral hatred and expect Jews to hate them back.

But, hey, hating Jews and saying they are responsible for what would have been an outrageously treacherous act  - bombing the Twin Towers - is a story that antisemites both Christian and Muslim particularly relish and desperately want to believe. The Christian antisemite would probably love to conduct the Inquisition all over again on the pesky Jews and Muslims while the Muslim antisemite would understandably prefer to think that it wasn't their lot who flew planes into the Twin Towers.

Priest banned from using social media sites for six months after posting 'anti-Semitic' comments claiming Israel was behind 9/11

It turns out that all these people whingeing to me about the Jews and Israel being responsible for 9/11 only meant the Wolfowitz Doctrine!
— Claire Khaw (@ntfem) February 10, 2015

If you want to waste over an hour of your life listening to Reverend Sizer prattling on go right ahead, but looking up the Wolfowitz Doctrine would be quicker and easier.

Superpower status
The doctrine announces the U.S’s status as the world’s only remaining superpower following the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War and proclaims its main objective to be retaining that status.

Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power.

This was substantially re-written in the April 16 release.

Our most fundamental goal is to deter or defeat attack from whatever source... The second goal is to strengthen and extend the system of defense arrangements that binds democratic and like-minded nations together in common defense against aggression, build habits of cooperation, avoid the renationalization of security policies, and provide security at lower costs and with lower risks for all. Our preference for a collective response to preclude threats or, if necessary, to deal with them is a key feature of our regional defense strategy. 

The third goal is to preclude any hostile power from dominating a region critical to our interests, and also thereby to strengthen the barriers against the re-emergence of a global threat to the interests of the U.S. and our allies.

U.S. primacy
The doctrine establishes the U.S’s leadership role within the new world order.
The U.S. must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. In non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. We must maintain the mechanism for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.
This was substantially re-written in the April 16 release.

One of the primary tasks we face today in shaping the future is carrying long standing alliances into the new era, and turning old enmities into new cooperative relationships. If we and other leading democracies continue to build a democratic security community, a much safer world is likely to emerge. If we act separately, many other problems could result.

Unilateralism
The doctrine downplays the value of international coalitions.

Like the coalition that opposed Iraqi aggression, we should expect future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies, often not lasting beyond the crisis being confronted, and in many cases carrying only general agreement over the objectives to be accomplished.

Nevertheless, the sense that the world order is ultimately backed by the U.S. will be an important stabilizing factor.

This was re-written with a change in emphasis in the April 16 release.

Certain situations like the crisis leading to the Gulf War are likely to engender ad hoc coalitions. We should plan to maximize the value of such coalitions. This may include specialized roles for our forces as well as developing cooperative practices with others.

Pre-emptive intervention
The doctrine stated the U.S’s right to intervene when and where it believed necessary.

While the U.S. cannot become the world's policeman, by assuming responsibility for righting every wrong, we will retain the preeminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations.

This was softened slightly in the April 16 release.

While the United States cannot become the world's policeman and assume responsibility for solving every international security problem, neither can we allow our critical interests to depend solely on international mechanisms that can be blocked by countries whose interests may be very different than our own. Where our allies interests are directly affected, we must expect them to take an appropriate share of the responsibility, and in some cases play the leading role; but we maintain the capabilities for addressing selectively those security problems that threaten our own interests.

Russian threat
The doctrine highlighted the possible threat posed by a resurgent Russia.
We continue to recognize that collectively the conventional forces of the states formerly comprising the Soviet Union retain the most military potential in all of Eurasia; and we do not dismiss the risks to stability in Europe from a nationalist backlash in Russia or efforts to reincorporate into Russia the newly independent republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and possibly others....We must, however, be mindful that democratic change in Russia is not irreversible, and that despite its current travails, Russia will remain the strongest military power in Eurasia and the only power in the world with the capability of destroying the United States.

This was removed from the April 16 release in favour of a more diplomatic approach.
The U.S. has a significant stake in promoting democratic consolidation and peaceful relations between Russia, Ukraine and the other republics of the former Soviet Union.

Middle East and Southwest Asia
The doctrine clarified the overall objectives in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.
In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region's oil. We also seek to deter further aggression in the region, foster regional stability, protect U.S. nationals and property, and safeguard our access to international air and seaways. As demonstrated by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, it remains fundamentally important to prevent a hegemon or alignment of powers from dominating the region. This pertains especially to the Arabian peninsula. Therefore, we must continue to play a role through enhanced deterrence and improved cooperative security.

The April 16 release was more circumspect and it reaffirmed U.S. commitments to Israel as well as its Arab allies.

In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, we seek to foster regional stability, deter aggression against our friends and interests in the region, protect U.S. nationals and property, and safeguard our access to international air and seaways and to the region's oil. The United States is committed to the security of Israel and to maintaining the qualitative edge that is critical to Israel's security. Israel's confidence in its security and U.S.-Israel strategic cooperation contribute to the stability of the entire region, as demonstrated once again during the Persian Gulf War. At the same time, our assistance to our Arab friends to defend themselves against aggression also strengthens security throughout the region, including for Israel.

Ben Brown's The Promise is an even-handed look at the making of the state of Israel. Brown rewinds a long while before 1948, to discussions conducted behind closed doors, mainly in Whitehall, during the First World War. In so doing he teases out the personalities, rivalries and complex motivations that informed the shaping of British policy in this area; a policy that would help deliver the Zionist dream in Palestine, with consequences which, the play subtly notes, the world is still contending with today.

Perhaps Ben Brown would like to write its sequel with the following characters and themes?

@ntfem @Smeggypants @CiFWatch @CofEGuildford Larry Silverstein. Dov Zakheim. Philip Zelikow. Paul Wolfowitz. Richard Perle, to name a few.
— Tony (@_skemperor) February 10, 2015

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Wolfowitz

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shaha_Riza

Wolfowitz’s girlfriend problem

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wolfowitz_Doctrine

Which actor would you like to play Paul Wolfowitz?